MAL-2026-5192

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## Source: amazon-inspector (a352d761eba6aa71b41fc09bb621d3f04e8c7c0e74487392a7c69e77719426b9) No concrete indicators of installer-side harm were identified in this version of weavedb-contracts. No lifecycle scripts, network beacons, credential reads, or known-bad infrastructure were observed. Coverage of this release was partial, so a human reviewer should confirm before publishing a verdict.

## Source: ghsa-malware (6e92067655db45791a54b80637fdbee8141a7f751833c10bb4115d93dc1c2048) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

## Source: google-open-source-security (146faaf0d97c6a533a969bc3f3f117811f9317dc865ed4ab37f1679842ddeaae) This package was compromised as part of the IronWorm campaign. This campaign executes a malicious binary payload during installation via a preinstall hook. The payload is a Rust-built infostealer that targets developer environments, scanning for and harvesting credentials related to cloud providers, object storage, databases, source-control, package registries, and AI developer tools. It also targets cryptocurrency wallets, specifically injecting a malicious JavaScript hook into the Exodus desktop wallet to capture passwords and recovery phrases. Furthermore, the malware exhibits worm-like behavior by stealing GitHub and NPM credentials to push malicious updates to the victim's repositories and publish trojanized packages, and it uses an eBPF-based kernel rootkit to hide its processes and network connections on Linux systems.