MAL-2026-4727

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (a98f87e329831590a7416ca47a949a7b21cf8e948491e875d8359ca8d5cc5959) package.json declares `"preinstall": "./tools/setup"`, which is a 976 KB Linux x86_64 ELF binary shipped in the tarball with no source, no build system, and no documentation. The README describes a pure-TypeScript Warp Contracts deploy plugin and contains no mention of a native helper — there is no legitimate reason for this package to execute an opaque native binary on every `npm install`. The shipped ELF contains strings consistent with a credential harvester: an HTTP/1.1 client, USERPROFILE/HOME environment reads, libbpf and PTRACE process-inspection capabilities, and X25519/Ed25519 cryptographic primitives. The package name `weavedb-warp-contracts-plugin-deploy` impersonates the legitimate `warp-contracts-plugin-deploy` published by warp.cc, and the README is copied verbatim from the legitimate package (linking to academy.warp.cc) despite this package being published under neither warp.cc nor an official WeaveDB scope. The combination of a typosquat-style lure with a documentation-mismatched native dropper auto-executed at install time is an unambiguous supply-chain attack: any developer who runs `npm install` against this package executes attacker-controlled native code with the user's privileges before any other code review can occur.