MAL-2026-4725

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (59e557cd0501bb17925a19c5d3525fdf18f286b21750a44c0164eb7e165f55d9) package.json declares "preinstall": "./dist/runtime.node", causing npm to execute a ~976 KB packed binary on every install. The file uses the `.node` extension typically reserved for Node.js native addons loaded via require()/process.dlopen, but here it is invoked directly as a shell command — not loaded as an addon. The binary is opaque (mostly non-ASCII, packed/obfuscated) and contains strings indicating HTTP networking (HTTP/1.1, POST, DELETE), environment-variable enumeration (USERPROFILE, PATH, LANG), TLS, and RSA/Ed25519 cryptography. There is no shipped source, no node-gyp/prebuild-install scaffolding, and no documented purpose for executing a binary at install. The combination of (a) lifecycle-hook execution of a shipped opaque binary, (b) misleading `.node` extension on a non-addon executable, and (c) embedded networking + env-scraping + crypto capability strings matches the dropper/credential-stealer fingerprint. On `npm install`, attacker-controlled code runs with the installer's privileges and has the capability to exfiltrate environment variables and credentials.