MAL-2026-4466

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (b28e2fe6ac03c8e426aeb69f62bf0b2bd4dfdb06a5acee273bb5967186c5504d) `@weirdorg/config` impersonates the widely-used `config` (node-config) package, copying its README verbatim including the `require('config')` usage example. The package's `index.js` redirects to `./lib/load.js`, a ~422 KB file protected with obfuscator.io-style RC4 string-array decoding wrapping a custom VM interpreter. The VM captures the host `require`, `module`, `exports`, `__dirname`, and `__filename` into a global context and then evaluates multiple large base64-encoded bytecode payloads (e.g. `_0x191ca6=["AcIHAQAEBOjIWW0O8b9jdskw9QJh7xQQCAAF7QEDACYE..."]`). The code also references `execArgv`, `inspector`, and `SIGUSR1` — debugger-evasion strings with no place in a configuration library. Because `lib/load.js` is loaded immediately by `index.js`, opaque attacker-controlled code executes the moment any consumer runs `require('@weirdorg/config')`. The combination of (a) name confusion against a top-tier registry package, (b) verbatim README copy to mislead installers, (c) replaced entrypoint pointing at a heavily obfuscated VM, and (d) captured host `require`/`module` handles plus interpreted bytecode is the canonical malicious-loader shape — the exact network/exec behavior is intentionally hidden behind two layers of obfuscation, but arbitrary code execution in the installer's Node process is implicit in the design.

## Source: ghsa-malware (91f716f1859f2c3baad2d64805ba149481d2c3ee3193cdb82e08742b2f827b97) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.