MAL-2026-3482

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (d97a7cf294a17c17e22c7eead7d3de9f693c5488aecba96129d5b79b52f430de) This version falls within the @tanstack/* package family compromised on 2026-05-11. The campaign published 42 packages × 2 versions each with the following structural fingerprints: a ~2.3 MB obfuscated JavaScript payload at the tarball root not declared in package.json's files array; an optionalDependencies entry pointing at an orphan commit in the repository's fork network (github:<owner>/<repo>#<sha> form); a second-stage payload fetched from litter.catbox.moe (anonymous 72-hour-TTL file host); credential harvesting from AWS IMDS, GCP metadata, Kubernetes service account tokens, ~/.npmrc, GitHub tokens (env, gh CLI,.git-credentials), and SSH keys; exfiltration via Session/Oxen (filev2.getsession.org, seed{1,2,3}.getsession.org) to defeat IP/domain blocking; self-propagation by enumerating the victim maintainer's other packages via registry.npmjs.org/-/v1/search?text=maintainer:<victim> and republishing them; and scraping the GitHub Actions runner's OIDC token from /proc/<pid>/mem to publish directly to registry.npmjs.org. Installing this version exposes any installer credentials reachable from the build/CI environment to attacker-controlled exfiltration channels.

## Source: ghsa-malware (3a732a8d98acc7dde8cda3fe949f1d2357f35b196af9ba42b70adfe005d3c5f1) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

## Source: google-open-source-security (5e1924464368f0c5816ee84e000cc47017f44045140feafbbc9e685d847ed5a5) This package was compromised as part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud is back" worm by the TeamPCP threat actor.

The package will steal credentials and then propogate it to every package it has access to. The package also attempts to remain persistent.