MAL-2026-13550

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (7db1d9b70bff8856c1f954e47b1b609be3a4123a0c937a4eecf70c3a598325f0) On require() of the package, index.js loads _bridge.js which unconditionally executes a setup routine that downloads a platform-specific executable from attacker-controlled Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev) whose hostnames are reconstructed at runtime by joining split string fragments. The bytes are written to /var/tmp or %TEMP% under names mimicking legitimate artifacts (dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows,.cache_<hex> on Unix), chmod 0755'd, and launched detached via /bin/sh -c "<path> &" or cmd.exe /c start. When the HTTPS mirrors fail, _bridge.js falls back to a DNS-TXT covert channel: it queries TXT records at c.<domain> against sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru to learn a chunk count, then retrieves the payload in numbered TXT records and base64-decodes the concatenation before writing and executing it through the same sink. The child_process module name is itself split ("child_"+"process") to evade static matching, and execution is gated by a ~19958-second cooldown plus DISABLE_TELEMETRY / DO_NOT_TRACK checks used as cover. Package name and version pattern are consistent with a typosquat / dependency-confusion lure.