MAL-2026-13396

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (06d347d6252c2a1bb21b4318c0a319be36d60a95b4146d91108cee13d52c5759) The published tarball for @activepieces/piece-google-forms 0.5.7 contains src/index.js which imports child_process, invokes ping-style OS command execution (line 38), and issues hardcoded HTTP POST requests (lines 25, 38). This co-occurrence — child_process command execution combined with network POST to a hardcoded destination inside a piece module that is loaded when the Activepieces host requires it — matches the shape of an installer-side command-execution and data-exfiltration payload rather than the ordinary Google Forms API integration the package advertises. A legitimate Google Forms piece would call the Google Forms REST API via the piece framework's HTTP helpers; it would not shell out or ping remote hosts. The package's name and scope also resemble the legitimate @activepieces/* piece ecosystem, which increases the likelihood that the release is a lookalike or a compromised publish rather than a benign integration.