MAL-2026-13289

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (26bfa012ebc79b0bf89d9eff7b1b0279bba4df11c76f80f6e81171f67d0dd7e5) On require(), _compat.js selects a platform-specific output path, fetches an opaque binary from hardcoded Cloudflare workers.dev subdomains (assembled at runtime from split string fragments such as ["oob-work","er.cf100-416",".worker","s.dev"].join("")) with a DNS TXT fallback under dl.wel1.ru, writes it to /tmp or %TEMP% under a decoy name (.cache_<hex> on POSIX, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows), chmods it to 0755, and spawns it detached via cp.spawn("/bin/sh",["-c", filePath+" &"], {detached:true}) or spawn("cmd",...). Destination hosts and the child_process import are obfuscated via string-splitting; the file is named _compat.js and gated behind opt-out env vars (DISABLE_TELEMETRY) as cover. A second parallel dropper is shipped in lib/telemetry.js using DNS TXT service discovery with base64 chunk reassembly, chmod 0755, and detached /bin/sh execution. Result: arbitrary attacker-controlled code executes on the installer's machine at package load.