MAL-2026-11982

npm/qlik-chart-modules is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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## Source: amazon-inspector (f4ba93c3a5ecd2c51e49f29421dac14eb4a65ef47f394c820471ea2635d81667) package.json declares preinstall `node setup.mjs`. setup.mjs is heavily obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style `_0xNNNN` identifiers and string-array dictionary aliases) and, when `bun` is not on PATH, downloads the Bun runtime zip from GitHub releases, extracts it to a temp directory, marks it executable, and invokes it via `execFileSync` to run the sibling file `math_init.js`. `math_init.js` is a single-line ~727KB opaque blob using an index-rotated string array (obfuscator.io shape), executed under the freshly downloaded alien runtime on every `npm install`. The package presents itself as Qlik chart tooling and lists `QlikTech International AB` as author, but a genuine Qlik utility library has no need to fetch a second language runtime at install time or execute a large obfuscated sibling payload; the shipped install-time behavior is inconsistent with the advertised purpose and matches the alternate-runtime-dropper pattern in which the fetched runtime is used to run bundled obfuscated code whose behavior cannot be inspected from source. Installing this package runs the obfuscated payload on the installer's host at install time.

## Source: ghsa-malware (ed96a289fab73fc785ca50095f96d381f4cea373d2cfd5b1eace8c44482c9c5b) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.