MAL-2026-11968

npm/eslint-plugin-folder-schema is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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## Source: amazon-inspector (2b205c840ac5285081348f04d030afe66c3c73234cd8dd6c4af76a8966dff6f1) package.json declares scripts.preinstall = 'node setup.mjs'. setup.mjs downloads the Bun runtime binary from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/, chmods it executable in a temp directory, and uses it to execute the shipped file math_init.js via execFileSync. math_init.js is a 727 KB obfuscated Bun-compiled CJS bundle beginning with '// @bun @bun-cjs', containing a large numeric string-array (n7gIxM), an array-rotation decoder helper (WV8StW), and a custom base64-like decoder alphabet — the file's only role in the package is to be executed by the Bun binary the preinstall hook fetches. An ESLint plugin has no legitimate need to fetch a second language runtime at install time and execute an opaque bundle through it. The package advertises author 'ServiceTitan' and homepage github.com/servicetitan/folder-lint, but the public folder-lint repository does not publish this npm package or ship these components, consistent with a name-hijack/impersonation of the ServiceTitan folder-lint project. The alternate-runtime dropper pattern here fetches a legitimate runtime from its official source but then uses it to execute attacker-shipped obfuscated code that no standard Node-based scanner will inspect, running automatically on every npm install.

## Source: ghsa-malware (ee9bb4b557f2e9b45c560f4e0cb372c640c9bb9df89d10a2ca7c18fe4f114af9) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.