MAL-2026-11926

npm/@servicetitan/startup-utils is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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## Source: amazon-inspector (d661bca7b156585bf8c48fb828c80564a29a51ee866e4d2a469aaa852da36300) package.json declares `"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`, which runs on `npm install`. setup.mjs is itself obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style hex variable names such as `_0x488df8`/`_0x52943e` and rotated string-lookup objects hiding constants like `utf8`, `ldd`, `/etc/os-release`, `unzip`, `powershell`). At install time it downloads the Bun runtime v1.3.13 from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/, extracts and chmod+x's the binary, then invokes that Bun binary against a tarball-shipped `math_init.js`. `math_init.js` is a 727KB single-line file marked `// @bun @bun-cjs` so it will only execute under Bun, and its body is heavily obfuscated (string-array + rotation via a `WV8StW` shuffler over a ~1000-entry hex/string array, hex-mangled identifiers, and embedded `with` blocks that break strict-mode ES parsers and webcrack). The package's advertised purpose is a ~1.5KB semver-mismatch helper, which has no need for an alternate JavaScript runtime or a 727KB payload. Fetching a second language runtime specifically to execute an obfuscated sibling script under it is the alternate-runtime-dropper shape and lets the payload bypass Node-based static analysis. The scope `@servicetitan/*` is a corporate namespace whose legitimate maintainers do not ship obfuscated Bun-only payloads for a trivial helper, consistent with a compromised-publish supply-chain incident.

## Source: ghsa-malware (8be9c32f7cbfef9ff98bb393ad203c87523eadb86dece38bd454d6e9b7e9f5df) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.