MAL-2026-11920

npm/@servicetitan/standalone-root is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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## Source: amazon-inspector (86e2c43f23c5f9bb8fa5624a6776e50b2ae4ba5c88d18fdf75428ad9ea429377) package.json declares scripts.preinstall = 'node setup.mjs'. setup.mjs is obfuscator.io-style protected (renamed identifiers, per-function string dictionaries) and at npm install time downloads the Bun runtime v1.3.13 from github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases, then execFileSync's Bun against the sibling file math_init.js. math_init.js is a 727KB Bun-CJS bundle with a shuffled string/number array and hex-named identifiers, characteristic of obfuscator.io/obf-runtime protection. The manifest advertises a React/mobx frontend data-provider library for ServiceTitan MFEs, with peerDependencies on @servicetitan/* packages and a CHANGELOG that only references frontend PRs at github.com/servicetitan/standalone-fe — nothing in the advertised purpose requires an alternate JavaScript runtime or an opaque 727KB bundle, and neither setup.mjs nor math_init.js is referenced by dist/, src/, or the changelog. The alternate-runtime dropper pattern (fetch a non-Node runtime specifically to execute a heavily obfuscated sibling bundle) auto-fires on npm install and executes code whose behavior is not inspectable by Node-oriented tooling in the installer's environment.

## Source: ghsa-malware (fd0da71f724db49ad79f438eb8cf80a6d5319efb263b14a3e9242d76613e8200) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.