MAL-2026-11902

npm/@servicetitan/microfront-auth is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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## Source: amazon-inspector (c960b7f8b1ee6289a8ebc86e7a1518452b6ef2b52b41cffff2ebb9f4d9a50d88) The package's `preinstall` hook runs `setup.mjs`, which downloads the Bun runtime binary from `github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/*.zip`, extracts it to a temp directory, marks it executable, and uses it to run the sibling `math_init.js` — a 727KB single-line file marked `// @bun @bun-cjs` obfuscated with a rotating string-array scheme and mangled `_0xNNNN` identifiers. The executed payload is unrelated to the library's advertised microfrontend authentication functionality (the real MobX/axios token-exchange code sits in `dist/*.js` and never references `math_init.js`), and no native source or build system is present that would justify fetching an alternate runtime. `setup.mjs` itself is also identifier-mangled. The package publishes under the `@servicetitan` npm scope with `repository.url` pointing at `github.com/servicetitan/playground.git`, impersonating ServiceTitan's public GitHub organization to lend credibility to the tarball. Installing the package on default `npm install` causes the obfuscated payload to execute on the installer host under a freshly-fetched Bun interpreter, giving the publisher arbitrary code execution on the installer's machine.

## Source: ghsa-malware (59d50611bc30401d277ad5dcb48bb7c491455eb9293fb3568a38d88e2ffaf1dd) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.