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MAL-2026-11895

Malicious code in @servicetitan/marketing-route (npm)

Details

npm/@servicetitan/marketing-route is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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## Source: amazon-inspector (588640203927cc1e6e5b001584b7cfecbd7b5644aaa0828f149d14ce91d7536e) package.json declares preinstall: node setup.mjs. setup.mjs downloads the Bun runtime binary from github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases (v1.3.13), extracts and chmod +x's it into a temporary directory, then execFileSync's it against the sibling math_init.js. math_init.js is a 727,680-byte single-line bundle with hex-mangled identifiers, a large numeric/string constant array, and a shift-based string-array rotation routine (obfuscator.io shape), with no readable strings, URLs, or logic. The declared package purpose is React marketing-route navigation; the src/ tree contains only React routing code and CHANGELOG.md documents only marketing-route features through v1.2.0 with no mention of setup.mjs, math_init.js, or a Bun-based install step. The alternate-runtime execution path bypasses Node-based scanners and runs the obfuscated payload on the installer's machine at npm install time. The shape is consistent with a hijacked-publish of the @servicetitan scope rather than an intentional maintainer change.

## Source: ghsa-malware (2fa9012b01ac76b832ecd6f79f22aa131e69066f6741af42ba9f24d2ef24389f) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

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Affected packages

npm / @servicetitan/marketing-route

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References