MAL-2026-11863

npm/@servicetitan/eslint-plugin-folder-schema is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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## Source: amazon-inspector (611b4ae6b395e21db8cc560947206b8690d8b897c05fb297eeac7ca2634ebcf9) Version 38.1.7 of this ESLint plugin adds a `preinstall: node setup.mjs` lifecycle hook and two root-level files (setup.mjs, math_init.js) that are not declared in the package's own `files` manifest (which lists only dist/ and src/). On `npm install`, setup.mjs downloads the Bun runtime from GitHub releases (github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases), extracts it to a temp directory, chmods it executable, and invokes it against the sibling math_init.js via execFileSync. math_init.js is a ~727 KB single-line heavily-obfuscated Bun bundle using rotated string-array obfuscation (WV8StW shift-rotator over the n7gIxM array) with hex-encoded identifiers. Fetching an alternate runtime specifically to execute a bundled obfuscated payload has no legitimate purpose in an ESLint plugin, and running the payload under Bun rather than Node bypasses Node-based supply-chain scanners. The src/ tree still contains the legitimate ESLint rule and the main entry dist/index.js is unchanged, consistent with a hijacked release that appended a dropper to an otherwise legitimate package. The manifest/tarball mismatch (setup.mjs and math_init.js are outside the declared files whitelist) corroborates the smuggling shape.

## Source: ghsa-malware (735eab0a4cea0ef32724e3202cc4ad384c6012ccf3c337f404e5dfa92f8b3310) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.