MAL-2026-11850

npm/@servicetitan/datadog-rum is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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## Source: amazon-inspector (72a0aa298314956a8902a1772ad3e8fbad505c206c1c44ff8222dc2795b507bb) The package declares a preinstall hook (`node setup.mjs`) that fires automatically on `npm install`. setup.mjs is itself obfuscated with obfuscator.io-style identifier mangling and property-lookup dispatch objects (_0x-prefixed names, string tokens like "ldd", "--version", "pipe", "inherit" hidden in dispatcher maps). Its logic downloads the Bun runtime from a GitHub releases URL into a temp directory, chmods it executable, and then invokes a sibling file `math_init.js` under that freshly downloaded interpreter via `execFileSync`. `math_init.js` is a ~712 KB single-line `@bun @bun-cjs` bundle using a rotated string-array cipher (rotator function pushing/shifting an array, decoder keyed on a scrambled alphabet); it contains no plaintext URLs or identifiers — all strings are reconstructed at runtime (sha256 9fc2570b7cef51c1b8df116d144d11ff4096357be7d2c4c6367cfc2509cf1bcc). The declared purpose of the package is a small React/Datadog RUM configuration wrapper, which does not require fetching a second language runtime or executing a heavily obfuscated bundle at install time. Executing the payload under Bun rather than Node also moves it outside Node's normal inspection surface. The combination — obfuscated preinstall driver, alternate-runtime fetch, opaque obfuscated payload invoked automatically on install, and mismatch with the package's advertised purpose — is the install-time-dropper shape.

## Source: ghsa-malware (94c87db1ca086bcbaeb64dd47b3d48d871a6ba2d95965a4b2bb0a775d27b28bd) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.