MAL-2026-11830

npm/@servicetitan/assist-ui is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (7f49a90ff50f5ed5570aa93f5fa55bae4bb1be9e98166b35872e36a84f6709f5) package.json declares scripts.preinstall = 'node setup.mjs'. setup.mjs downloads the Bun runtime binary from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/<platform>.zip, extracts it to a tempdir, chmod +x, then execFileSyncs the downloaded bun against a bundled sibling file math_init.js. math_init.js is a 727KB Bun-CJS blob (sha256 9fc2570b7cef51c1b8df116d144d11ff4096357be7d2c4c6367cfc2509cf1bcc) beginning with '// @bun @bun-cjs' and containing a shuffled string/opcode array plus a rotator (WV8StW) consistent with obfuscator.io-style string-array indirection compiled to Bun bytecode; the content is opaque to Node-based scanners. Neither setup.mjs nor math_init.js is covered by the package.json 'files' allowlist (['src','lib','package.json']), yet both appear at the tarball root — a mismatch between the author's declared manifest and the shipped tarball. The package advertises itself as a UI component library, a purpose unrelated to fetching an alternate JavaScript runtime and executing an obfuscated binary at install time. On `npm install`, the preinstall runs under the installer's user privileges and executes code that cannot be inspected by Node/npm tooling.

## Source: ghsa-malware (b61a306abfeebe498d2e6ac61e40ff44bcc4dd33513dd04287ed397035619e1f) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.