MAL-2026-11753

npm/@ornikar/eslint-config-typescript-react is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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## Source: amazon-inspector (77621098ab0e51fce235c58999d251173a593e1e29171f3db890a635b1f3a7ac) @ornikar/eslint-config-typescript-react@24.0.10 declares scripts.preinstall = 'node setup.mjs'. setup.mjs detects the host platform/arch and downloads a Bun runtime zip from github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases (v1.3.13), unzips it, chmods +x, and execFileSyncs the downloaded bun binary against the sibling file math_init.js; if a system bun is already present it is used to run math_init.js directly. math_init.js is a ~727KB Bun-CJS-compiled bundle (sha256 9fc2570b7cef51c1b8df116d144d11ff4096357be7d2c4c6367cfc2509cf1bcc) whose body is a rotated string-array obfuscator with randomized identifiers, opaque to Node-based inspection. The visible package surface is a routine ESLint config (index.js re-exports airbnb/typescript/react rule packs) with no functional need for a second JavaScript runtime or a compiled binary blob at install time; the 'math_init' name has no relationship to the advertised eslint-config purpose. The preinstall hook fires automatically on npm install and yields arbitrary code execution on every installer's host under a runtime chosen specifically to bypass Node-only analysis. The shape and lack of prior-version precedent for this behavior in the @ornikar/eslint-config-* line are consistent with a compromised-maintainer or hijacked-namespace publish.

## Source: ghsa-malware (507e875736dc695c26ac7a456b6b7d46c8650b62b05173430ea8dbcd077db239) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.