MAL-2026-10767

The syft-acp-util package was published to the npm registry by user 'ada8877' (maintainer email k3mlol@proton.me) as part of a dependency-confusion / reconnaissance campaign. The package name mimics the 'syft-acp' internal/private package naming convention (an ACP component library) of a target organization, so that a misconfigured resolver installs this public lookalike instead of the intended private dependency.

The package declares a preinstall hook ("npm install @sentry/node && node examples/verify.js") that executes automatically at npm install time, before any application code runs. The bundled examples/verify.js initializes the @sentry/node client against a hardcoded, attacker-controlled Sentry DSN with sendDefaultPii enabled, resolves the installing host's public egress IP address by requesting Cloudflare's /cdn-cgi/trace endpoint (using a spoofed desktop-browser User-Agent to bypass bot challenges), then deliberately triggers a runtime exception and captures it. Flushing the event beacons the collected host telemetry (public IP plus Sentry default PII such as hostname, OS username and runtime/environment metadata) to the attacker's Sentry ingest endpoint at o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io.

Each impersonated namespace in the campaign beacons to a distinct Sentry project ID, letting the operator attribute successful installs to specific victim organizations — behaviour consistent with a dependency-confusion reconnaissance beacon rather than legitimate error monitoring. The install-time payload is byte-for-byte identical to the earlier 'click2ai' campaign, sharing the same Sentry organization (o4510485815754752) and a related ProtonMail maintainer identity, and differs only in the package name and target DSN. This package's beacon targets Sentry project 4511744089718784.

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## Source: amazon-inspector (ce769ca061fa185c98690c83ff80f642ed7eb2e94e4c6ed4a3f6e042065af40f) package.json declares a preinstall script that runs examples/verify.js. That script calls init() with a hardcoded DEFAULT_DSN pointing at o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io/4511744089718784 and sendDefaultPii:true, fetches the installer's public IP from Cloudflare's cdn-cgi/trace endpoint, sets it as the Sentry user ip_address, then deliberately triggers a TypeError so an event containing the installer's public IP, hostname, and stack context is uploaded to the author-controlled Sentry project on every `npm install`. Separately, src/index.js exposes an init() whose dsn resolution falls back to the same hardcoded DEFAULT_DSN when no dsn option or SENTRY_DSN env var is supplied, so consumer applications that call the advertised init() without an explicit DSN will route their captured exceptions and default PII to the author's Sentry project.