MAL-2026-10503

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## Source: amazon-inspector (c735b8bb20a784446d7a0a4c49369ca3f2696bfe2e8a004799c763fc0a064aca) On require by n8n (module-load, top-level code in dist/RceNode.node.js), the package runs a shell command via execSync('/bin/sh',...). The command is taken from process.env.__N8N_RCE_CMD with a default of 'id && hostname && uname -a', so even an unconfigured install shells out and leaks host identity at load time, in the n8n host process and outside the vm2 sandbox. When process.env.__N8N_RCE_CB is set and EXEC_MODE is 'webhook' or 'both', the executed command's stdout/stderr/exitCode are serialized to JSON and HTTP-POSTed to the URL specified in __N8N_RCE_CB (dist/RceNode.node.js:28-40), giving a complete env-driven exfiltration channel to any destination. The node also exposes an execute() method that runs arbitrary user-supplied shell commands via /bin/sh on the n8n host, breaking the workflow Code-node sandbox model. The package.json description self-identifies as an 'n8n RCE proof-of-concept node'. There is no benign installer use: any n8n instance that installs this gains a drop-in remote-code-execution primitive plus a configurable exfiltration callback.