GHSA-xrvj-v92f-53gj

## Impact

An uncontrolled-resource-consumption (memory exhaustion) denial-of-service vulnerability (CWE-400 / CWE-789).

A client with push access could push a tiny crafted thin pack (~174 bytes) whose delta header declares a huge dest_size. When dulwich ingested it via add_thin_pack / apply_delta, it would allocate hundreds of MB of memory based on that attacker-controlled size, with no relationship to the actual bytes received.

Who is impacted: Operators running a Dulwich-based Git server that exposes git-receive-pack (i.e. accepts pushes) - for example via dulwich.server functionality, the HTTP smart server, or anything built on ReceivePackHandler.

## Patches

Patched in 1.2.5.

add_thin_pack now accepts a max_input_size keyword (bytes; 0/None = unlimited, matching git's semantics), and ReceivePackHandler reads receive.maxInputSize from the repository config and passes it through. Wire reads are counted and a PackInputTooLarge exception is raised once the cap is exceeded - equivalent to git index-pack --max-input-size.

Users should upgrade to Dulwich 1.2.5 or later and set receive.maxInputSize in their server's repository config to a sane bound for their environment.

## Workarounds

On unpatched versions, receive.maxInputSize has no effect, so it cannot be used as a workaround. Until upgrading, operators should:

- Restrict dulwich-receive-pack (push) access to trusted, authenticated clients only, or disable it entirely on servers that only need to serve fetches. - Run the server under an OS-level memory limit (e.g. ulimit, cgroups/MemoryMax, or a container memory limit) so a malicious push is killed rather than taking down the host.

## Resources

- git's receive.maxInputSize / git index-pack --max-input-size documentation - Reported by Liyi, Ziyue, Strick, Maurice and Chenchen @ University of Sydney