GHSA-vffc-f7r7-rx2w

### Summary A command injection vulnerability exists in OpenClaw’s Linux systemd unit generation path. When rendering `Environment=` entries, attacker-controlled values are not rejected for CR/LF, and `systemdEscapeArg()` uses an incorrect whitespace-matching regex. This allows newline injection to break out of an `Environment=` line and inject standalone systemd directives (for example, `ExecStartPre=`). On service restart, the injected command is executed, resulting in local arbitrary command execution (local RCE) under the gateway service user.

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### Details The issue is in `src/daemon/systemd-unit.ts`:

- `renderEnvLines(...)` builds: - `Environment=${systemdEscapeArg(`${key}=${value}`)}` - No CR/LF validation is enforced for environment keys/values before writing unit lines. - `systemdEscapeArg(...)` uses: - `/[\\s"\\\\]/` - In this regex, `\\s` is interpreted as a literal backslash + `s`, not a whitespace character class. As a result, whitespace detection/quoting behavior is incorrect. Because systemd parses unit files line-by-line, a newline inside an environment value can inject an additional directive line. Example rendered output:

```ini Environment=INJECT=ok ExecStartPre=/bin/touch /tmp/oc15789_rce ```

At restart time, systemd executes `ExecStartPre`, enabling command execution.

Relevant code path/components involved in exploitation chain: - `src/daemon/systemd-unit.ts` - `src/commands/daemon-install-helpers.ts` - `src/config/env-vars.ts` - `src/config/zod-schema.ts`

Trigger conditions: 1. Attacker can influence `config.env.vars` (directly or indirectly). 2. Install/reinstall path is invoked to write/update the unit. 3. Service restart occurs (`systemctl --user restart ...`).

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### PoC Environment: Linux host with systemd user services enabled.

1. Configure a malicious environment value in OpenClaw config (`config.env.vars`), including a newline and injected directive: - Key: `INJECT` - Value: ```text ok ExecStartPre=/bin/touch /tmp/oc15789_rce ```

2. Install/reinstall the gateway service (fixed port as requested): ```bash openclaw gateway install --port 15789 --force ```

3. Inspect the generated user unit file (default path): ```bash ~/.config/systemd/user/openclaw-gateway.service ``` Verify that an injected standalone line exists: ```ini ExecStartPre=/bin/touch /tmp/oc15789_rce ```

4. Reload and restart user service: ```bash systemctl --user daemon-reload ``` ```bash systemctl --user restart openclaw-gateway.service ```

5. Confirm command execution side effect: ```bash ls -l /tmp/oc15789_rce ``` ---

### Impact This is a local command execution vulnerability in OpenClaw’s systemd unit generation during install/reinstall flows.

- **Type:** Command injection via newline/directive injection in unit file generation. - **Execution context:** Runs with the same privileges as the OpenClaw gateway service user. - **Affected users:** Linux deployments using systemd user services where an attacker can control `config.env.vars` and trigger install/reinstall.

## Fix Commit(s) - `61f646c41fb43cd87ed48f9125b4718a30d38e84`