GHSA-p749-9w62-w533

## Summary The Tilt HUD server mounts Go's `net/http/pprof` handlers under `/debug` with no access control. When the HUD is network-exposed, an attacker can read process memory — including session and apiserver tokens — and hold the process under profiling.

## Details A blank import of `net/http/pprof` registers its handlers on `http.DefaultServeMux`, which the HUD controller mounts under `/debug` on both the web router and the apiserver listener. `/debug/pprof/heap` and `/goroutine` expose process memory, including the session token (also issued in the `Tilt-Token` cookie) and the apiserver loopback bearer token; `/profile` and `/trace` let a caller sample the process for an arbitrary duration.

## Impact An unauthenticated caller who can reach the listener can extract process memory — including the session and apiserver tokens — and degrade performance by holding the process under CPU profiling or tracing. The leaked tokens compound the missing-authentication finding on the same server.

### Conditions for exploitation - Affected version in `>= 0.19.5, <= 0.37.3`. - HUD (or apiserver) listener bound to a non-loopback address (`tilt up --host 0.0.0.0`, or `TILT_HOST` set). - Network reachability to the listener (default port `10350`).

### Not affected - The default loopback-only bind is not reachable from the network.

## Workarounds Use the default loopback bind (omit `--host`, unset `TILT_HOST`) so `/debug` is not remotely reachable. No complete workaround short of upgrading for non-loopback deployments.