GHSA-8r8h-6vcc-xhrv

## Finding — Unauthorized Workspace Variables disclosure via $vars injection (bypasses variables:view)

### What’s wrong (code locations)

- Variables for the active workspace are fetched without checking “variables:view” at this call site: flowise-src/ packages/components/src/utils.ts:932 - Runtime variables are resolved from server environment variables: flowise-src/packages/components/src/utils.ts:976 - $vars is always injected into the code execution sandbox: flowise-src/packages/components/src/utils.ts:1782 - The official Variables API is permission-protected (contrast): flowise-src/packages/server/src/routes/variables/ index.ts:11

### Why it is a privilege boundary bypass

A user/API key might be denied variables:view (and the /api/v1/variables route enforces it), but they can still:

- call /api/v1/node-custom-function (Finding 1) - and have $vars pre-populated with all variables for the workspace, including runtime values from process.env

### What data is exposed

Inside the custom JS context, $vars contains a flat map of:

- Variable.name -> Variable.value for static variables, and - Variable.name -> process.env[Variable.name] for runtime variables (type === 'runtime')

This can expose secrets such as database passwords, JWT secrets, SMTP passwords, cloud keys, etc., depending on what the workspace Variables are configured to map.

### Recommended fix (minimum)

- Do not inject $vars unless the caller is authorized: - enforce variables:view before injecting $vars, or - inject only an explicit allowlist of variables needed for the function - Consider disabling or heavily restricting type=runtime variables in self-hosted environments (or restrict which env keys may be mapped).