GHSA-6cp8-v795-jr2j

### Summary

[CVE-2026-47066](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47066) is an infinite loop (CWE-835) in hackney's Alt-Svc response header parser (`src/hackney_altsvc.erl`). When an HTTP server returns an `Alt-Svc` header whose value begins with a non-token byte (e.g. `!`, `@`, `=`, `;`), the parser enters a tight tail-recursive loop that pins an Erlang scheduler at 100% CPU and permanently hangs the calling connection process. Because the parser is invoked synchronously on every HTTP response, any attacker-controlled origin can trigger the hang with a single-byte header value.

### Details

**1. Parser dispatch**

`parse_and_cache/3` is called inside the hackney connection process on each HTTP response. It collects all `Alt-Svc` header values via `collect_altsvc_headers/1`, concatenates them, and passes the result to `parse/1`, which calls `parse_entries(Header, [])`.

**2. Failed token consumption**

`parse_entries/2` → `parse_entry/1` → `parse_protocol/1` → `parse_token(Data, <<>>)`. The function `parse_token/2` pattern-matches leading bytes: alphanumeric, `-`, `_`, whitespace, and comma all have explicit clauses. Any other byte (e.g. `!`) falls through to the catch-all:

```erlang parse_token(Rest, <<>>) -> {undefined, Rest}. ```

This returns the *input unchanged* — no byte is consumed.

**3. No-progress loop**

`parse_entry` propagates `{undefined, Rest}` back to `parse_entries/2`, which calls `skip_comma(Rest)`. Because the first byte is not `,`, `skip_comma` also returns `Rest` unchanged. `parse_entries` then recurses with the identical buffer:

```erlang parse_entries(Data, Acc) % Data identical to previous iteration ```

Erlang tail recursion never preempts on a pure CPU loop, so the scheduler is pinned and the process never yields or returns.

**4. Root cause**

`parse_entries/2` has no guard that detects zero-byte progress after a failed `parse_entry` call and no fallback to advance past the offending byte.

### PoC

1. Start an HTTP server that responds with the header `Alt-Svc: !` (any single non-token byte suffices). 2. Issue any HTTP GET request via hackney to that server: ```erlang hackney:request(get, "http://attacker.example/", [], <<>>, []) ``` 3. Observe that the call never returns; the Erlang scheduler hosting the connection process is pinned at 100% CPU indefinitely.

Alternatively, call the parser directly: `hackney_altsvc:parse(<<"!">>)` — the process hangs immediately.

### Impact

Denial of service via unbounded CPU consumption. Any application using hackney 2.0.0-beta.1 through 4.0.0 that connects to attacker-controlled HTTP endpoints is affected. No authentication is required; a single response header byte is sufficient to hang the connection process. Fixed in hackney 4.0.1. CVSS v4.0 score: **8.7 (HIGH)**.

## Resources

* Introduction commit: https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/408e5fe20302226ea8c74dde2bcbd452d712b5b2 * Patch commit: https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/e548aba1f97ffa3f4750da7b772998fb78c01894