GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7

## Summary

Budibase automation steps (outgoing webhook, Zapier, n8n, Slack, Discord, Make.com) make server-side HTTP requests to user-provided URLs using `node-fetch` directly, completely bypassing the IP blacklist protection that exists in the REST API integration. Additionally, the REST API blacklist itself defaults to empty when `BLACKLIST_IPS` is not configured.

## Vulnerable Code

### Automation Steps (No Blacklist)

All automation steps use `fetch()` directly without any IP validation:

**`packages/server/src/automations/steps/outgoingWebhook.ts` line 69:** ```typescript const response = await fetch(url, request) // No blacklist check ```

**`packages/server/src/automations/steps/zapier.ts` line 34:** ```typescript response = await fetch(url, {method: "post", ...}) // No blacklist check ```

**`packages/server/src/automations/steps/n8n.ts` line 53:** ```typescript response = await fetch(url, request) // No blacklist check ```

**`packages/server/src/automations/steps/slack.ts` line 20:** ```typescript response = await fetch(url, {method: "post", ...}) // No blacklist check ```

**`packages/server/src/automations/steps/discord.ts` line 29:** ```typescript response = await fetch(url, {method: "post", ...}) // No blacklist check ```

### REST API Integration (Empty Default Blacklist)

**`packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts` line 684:** ```typescript if (await blacklist.isBlacklisted(url)) { throw new Error("Cannot connect to URL.") } ```

But `BLACKLIST_IPS` env var defaults to undefined, so the blacklist is empty:

**`packages/backend-core/src/blacklist/blacklist.ts` lines 39-45:** ```typescript if (blackListArray?.length === 0) { return false // Always passes when no IPs configured } ```

## Impact

- **Automation steps**: ANY user can create automations with webhook/Zapier/n8n/Slack/Discord steps pointing to internal IPs. These completely bypass the blacklist module - **REST API**: Even when BLACKLIST_IPS is configured, it only blocks listed IPs. Default deployments have no protection. - **Cloud metadata**: `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/` accessible via any automation step - **Internal services**: Access databases, admin panels, Kubernetes API on private IPs

## Remediation

1. Apply blacklist checks to ALL outbound HTTP requests, including automation steps 2. Add hardcoded default private IP ranges (127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16) 3. Use a centralized HTTP client wrapper instead of direct `fetch()` calls 4. SSRF protection should be on by default, not opt-in via environment variable